Today, the Subcommittee on African Affairs

takes up a complex and compelling case, the case of Sudan. For our

purposes today, we are stepping out of what might be called the

weak states framework that we have been using in our hearings

to look at situations in Somalia and Liberia, and the Democratic

Republic of Congo.

It will come as no great shock to the administration that I am

using those hearings and that framework to try to draw attention

to those situations, and to try to suggest that the United States

needs to focus on them in a more serious and coherent and committed

fashion.

I have tried to make the point again and again that it is in the

United States ’ interests to develop a long-term approach to engagement

in these difficult places, rather than just abandoning them to

criminal opportunists and abusive warlords.

But today, we talk about Sudan. And Sudan has the attention of

the administration. It seems to me to be a focus of this administration ’s

most significant policy initiative in the region. The President

and the Secretary of State have spoken out about Sudan. The

President appointed Senator John Danforth to be his Special Envoy

for Peace in Sudan. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios was

named Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan. As a result of

Senator Danforth ’s efforts, the International Eminent Persons

Group has investigated means for preventing abductions and slavery

and has reported on its findings. And in the case of Sudan, no

one is talking about a quick fix. Clearly everyone involved with the

administration ’s initiative recognizes that a long-term commitment

is required if we are serious about helping the Sudanese people end

the nightmare in which they have lived, and in too many instances,

died, over these many years.

So I give the administration credit for making this issue a priority,

but I give Sudan advocates even more credit, because it was

their work over the years that got Sudan on the agenda in the first

place. Human rights activists, advocates focused on fighting religious persecution, individuals and groups most appalled by the persistence

of slavery in Sudan, humanitarian professionals horrified

by the desperate conditions in much of the country, Sudanese refugees

haunted by their own memories and working to help their

countrymen: These voices made the difference and joined with

many voices long concerned about Sudan ’s involvement in international

terrorism. These voices have moved the truth from Sudan

from obscurity to the baseline for policy.

Finally, we are at a point at which we do not need to have another

hearing establishing the brutal nature of the conflict. We do

not need another hearing to conclude that gross human rights

abuses are committed regularly in Sudan. We do not need another

hearing establishing that parts of the country persist in near-constant

state of humanitarian crisis.

Obviously, we have to keep these truths in mind. We must remember

there are an estimated two million who have died in just

the past decade from war-related causes and that millions more

have been displaced, but we must also move beyond stating the

gruesome statistics to focus at last on actions and responses.

And in that vein, we do not need to have a hearing to try to identify

the administration ’s policy goals. They have been clearly identified:

To ensure that Sudan is not a base for international terrorism,

to end the civil war through a just and lasting peace, to secure

unhindered access for humanitarian efforts, and to improve

human rights conditions for the Sudanese people.

I do not question these objectives. I accept them and I applaud

them. I have called this hearing today because I am trying to figure

out exactly where we are in the process of pursuing them and precisely

how we plan to move ahead.

Many in Congress want to use capital market sanctions and disclosure

provisions which are contained in the House version of the

Sudan Peace Act to apply pressure to the Government of Sudan.

I have made my position clear on that issue. But the administration

opposes these provisions. We should talk about that point of

contention, and as you know, many of my colleagues are deeply

committed to these provisions. But the sanctions are not the focus

of this hearing today. Regardless of our disagreements on that

issue, we ought to be able to find a way to move our policy agenda

forward.

So let us explore how we might do that. What are the tools in

our policy toolbox beyond the capital market proposal? What kind

of leverage do we have with the parties? What incentives and disincentives

can we hold out to encourage behavior that will bring us

closer to achieving our goals?

And to take the toolbox analogy a little bit further, what about

the nuts and bolts of implementation? Do we have the personnel,

the resources, the appropriate mechanisms for decision making that

are required to move this policy forward in four very challenging

areas? Are we moving quickly enough, or are our efforts languishing

for lack of a sense of urgency or effective means of execution?

Let me give some examples of the kinds of issues I would like

to explore. Senator Danforth succeeded in getting both the Government

of Sudan and the Sudanese People ’s Liberation Army to agree

to allow a monitoring team to verify their stated commitment not

to intentionally attack civilian targets. That happened in the

spring.

But as I understand it, we still have no monitors on the ground,

and reports of attacks on civilians persist. So what are we waiting

for?

Or to take another example, one of our policy goals is to improve

the human rights situation in Sudan. The Eminent Persons Group

made 16 recommendations in its report on Slavery, Abduction, and

Forced Servitude in Sudan. Who is following up on these recommendations?

Is the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor involved in developing and executing a concrete plan to pursue

these recommendations? I have a long list of questions along

these lines.

And so we have the attention of the administration at very high

levels. We have a number of different segments of the American

public interested in the issue. We have a tremendous amount of

will here in the Congress to make progress in Sudan.

And as Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I look

at these ingredients and really marvel at them. This is a remarkable

set of assets to bring to bear on an African issue. I hope that

we will make the most of them.

And with that, and certainly in recognition of what a tremendous

asset he is in this regard, I turn to the ranking member, Senator

Frist, whose personal commitment to Sudan is truly extraordinary

and whose partnership I greatly value on all of the subcommittee ’s

endeavors, but on this issue really most of all.

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Sudan. And as Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I look at these

ingredients and marvel at them. This is a remarkable set of assets to bring to bear

on an African issue. I hope that we make the most of them.

Thank you very much, Senator Frist.

I have a statement here from Senator Boxer, who wanted to be

here, but she had a scheduling conflict, so I will enter this into the

record, if there is no objection.

We will now turn to our first panel. Today,

we will hear from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

Walter Kansteiner, who is just back from Nairobi and Khartoum,

where he has been working on these issues. And, Mr. Secretary, as

always I certainly appreciate your willingness to be here today to

answer our questions and to, if you will, go into the weeds, if necessary,

to figure out some of the specifics. And I would ask you to

proceed with your testimony at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We certainly appreciate

that report and look forward to asking you some questions

about it.

But, first, we will listen to Mr. Roger Winter, who we also have

with us today, from the U.S. Agency for International Development,

where he is the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict

and Humanitarian Assistance.

Thank you very much, Mr. Winter.

We will start the questions for panel one. We

will do 10-minute rounds. And I will start. I will ask the first questions

for Mr. Kansteiner.

Mr. Winter, if you want to add something, please speak up.

Mr. Kansteiner, you noted the civilian bombing verification team

will be fully staffed and operational in what you called the very

near future. What does that mean? Does it mean by the end of this

month?

End of August?

What will be the team’s mandate?

OK. And in the Danforth report, it refers to

a staff of 15, and your written statement refers to 25 staff. What

is accurate, and what is an adequate number to do the job?

Secretary KANSTEINER. Twenty-five is what we believe is going

to be needed for this. And we have the funding—Charlie, how is—

what do we have the funding for?

It is a pretty big country, obviously. Is 25

enough?

And I think you, at least described or alluded

to the logistical support that the team will have, but just go over

that again.

And the financing is $5 million.

And the goal is to total how much?

OK. You described that the information

would come back that the team collects and that it would be analyzed.

And you said certain things would flow from that.

What kinds of action would it trigger if it is verified that the

bombing is continuing?

We have been talking about the international

Eminent Persons Group and the careful report they presented on

Slavery, Abduction, and Forced Servitude in Sudan. Has either the

report or the accompanying recommendations been translated into

Arabic or any other languages? And to what extent has this report

been disseminated in Sudan or elsewhere outside of the United

States?

When will the Arabic translation be done,

and when can I reasonably expect that the various versions of this

will be disseminated, and how broadly will it be disseminated?

OK. I am still not 100 percent certain about

what the consequences are for continued civilian bombing. It is not

going to deter this activity unless there is some sense of clear consequences.

Obviously you mentioned the impact of the bilateral relationship

and the fact that it could have a negative impact on the

peace process, but I guess I am looking for something a little more

precise.

I am pleased you mentioned some of those,

because I do think this is a good forum to put on the record what

some of these issues and potential consequences are.

Several of the recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group

relate to the need for additional human rights monitoring and research

into the practice of slavery in Sudan. And the group notes

that information has been difficult to obtain because both parties

to the conflict have obstructed research into the practice.

And I wonder if you could talk about the motivations behind this

kind of obstructionism. The Khartoum Government, of course, must

believe that it gains more from tacit acceptance of this practice

than it would gain from a full scale assault on the practice of slavery.

Do you think that is true? And, if so, what motivates the calculation

of Khartoum on this issue in your view?

Senator Frist, I am just going to ask the

other half of that question and then turn to you.

On the other side, I am even more sort of intrigued and concerned

by the fact that the group finds that the SPLM has obstructed

investigations into slavery when it is primarily in the communities

in the South that are affected by the crime. Could you

discuss their reluctance to address this issue more forcefully?

Thank you very much.

Senator Frist.

Thank you.

I will begin a second round. And I want to go back to the Eminent

Persons report. But first let me follow on Senator Frist’s last

questions. Would the President veto a bill that contained capital

market sanctions?

Fair enough.

Let me ask you, again, about the Eminent

Persons report. It recommends that the United States in collaboration

with other governments should establish a mechanism to follow up

Quarter of this year?

on these recommendations. What steps are you taking to establish

such a mechanism?

When can we expect the roll out that you just

described?

OK.

Yes, Mr. Winter.

All right. I am going to now go to a subject

that Senator Frist was getting into, and it has to do with this

whole dilemma of seeking assistance in fighting terrorism, while at

the same time wanting to achieve so many of the goals that we

have tried to achieve with regard to Sudan.

And I think the questions about implementing our policy goals

with regard to terrorist threats are probably, as you suggested, in

general best left to secure settings. But I do want to get into one

part of it in this open hearing.

As we push Khartoum to take clear steps to ensure that Sudan

is not a haven for international terrorists, I assume that we are offering

them incentives for progress and disincentives for failure.

That is generally how we try to influence behavior in any situation

like this.

Well, what about a scenario in which the Government of Sudan

is being very cooperative on the counter-terrorism front but completely

uncooperative with regard to these other policy goals, like

human rights and humanitarian access? It would seem to me that

the only way this would work would be a scenario in which incentives

and disincentives involved are separate and distinct for these

different policy initiatives. Otherwise, we risk losing leverage to reward

behavior in one area and leaving ourselves without any tools

to use in another. Do you think this is the case?

That is right. And I am wondering how plausible

you think it is that the United States will use meaningful disincentives,

sticks if you will, to respond to failures on the humanitarian front, if we are enjoying cooperation on counter-terrorism

issues.

From press reports, that might be the situation we are finding

ourselves in. What kind of sticks have we employed in recent

months?

Mr. Winter.

Why do we not get into some of the specifics

of the humanitarian access? And this is for both of you. What steps

have been taken to respond to the Government of Sudan’s ban on

humanitarian flights in Western Upper Nile?

You were talking about this, Mr. Winter.

And what has been the consequence for the Government of

Sudan? And what can be done for the Sudanese civilians in the

Western Upper Nile despite the ban? Mr. Winter, do you want to

start with that?

Do you want to follow on that?

Say that one more time.

A moment.

Excuse me, Mr. Kansteiner. You may finish.

I just wanted to determine if Senator Frist

was coming back right now or not. Had you finished your answer?

Well, I am just going to continue then with

a third round, and obviously when Senator Frist comes back, we

will go back to him, but thank you for your answer to that.

And I will ask both of you: What is the current status of the recent

dispute over where OLS flights should originate? What is the

U.S. Government’s position on the Government of Sudan’s demand

that relief flights must originate from northern Sudan as opposed

to Lokichokio in Kenya? Has this issue been resolved?

Mr. Kansteiner, in the past, Egypt and Libya

were engaged in an alternative peace initiative that competed with

IGAD and allowed the parties to the conflict to play various negotiators

off each other.

Libya is always something of a wild card. But say a little bit

about Egypt. Has the Egyptian approach to Sudan fundamentally

changed, and did their interests change here?

Secretary, last month, you told the House

International Relations Committee that oil revenue is critical to the

solution of Sudan. And I am told that Senator Danforth has expressed

the same view.

Could you tell me why you think that oil will be a force for peace

in Sudan, when competition for valuable resources has been a force

driving conflict in so many other places in Africa, in Sierra Leone

and the Congo, for example? What is different about this situation?

Thank you. My last couple of questions, before

I turn to Senator Brownback, are more in the sort of nuts and

bolts area.

As the United States pursues multiple policy aims in Sudan, coordination

would seem to be difficult. What are the internal mechanisms

within the administration to ensure that our efforts on all

these fronts are coordinated and properly sequenced?

So you do think there is enough people to

pursue the goals daily, to seize on every opportunity as these issues

come forward?

Enough people on the ground in Sudan?

How about our liaisons with the humanitarian

community, both OLS and non OLS? Are they adequate?

Do we have a permanent presence following

the IGAD process? How many people——

Is this their exclusive responsibility, or are

they dealing with all the very important things that are happening

in Kenya as well?

Thank you very much.

I am delighted to see my colleague Senator Brownback here. I

ask you for a statement or a line of questioning.

Well, thank you, Senator Brownback. And obviously

we recognize the tremendous importance of this country

and this situation and admire your commitment on the issue.

And I want to thank both of you for your tremendous patience,

and especially Secretary Kansteiner for your participation in all the

hearings this year. We are very pleased with the series of hearings

we have had. And you have been a great contributor to them, so

thank you very much.

We have an excellent second panel today. I

would ask them to come forward at this time.

We will start this panel. As I said, it is an excellent private panel

of witnesses.

Mr. John Prendergast is the co-director of the Africa Program at

the International Crisis Group. During the Clinton administration,

he served as Special Advisor to the U.S. State Department specializing

in conflict resolution initiatives in Africa.

Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Prendergast was an

executive fellow of the United States Institute of Peace and, before

that, Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council.

Sir, it is good to have you with us again, and I will have you

start with your testimony.

I thank all of you for your patience today and

for your testimony. And I do just have a few questions that I would

like to pursue.

First for Dr. Morrison and Mr. Prendergast: To what degree is

corruption a problem within the Sudanese Government today, and

what about within the SPLM? And let me sort of suggest why I

ask. I am trying to understand something about the calculus of

leadership here.

Why should the Government of Sudan negotiate a just peace that

ends the conflict, recognizes the South’s right to self-determination,

and includes mechanisms for transparency in the oil sector and

revenue sharing?

Today, that government need not take the South’s views into account

in its policies, and can spend its limited oil revenues in any

way it pleases. Since the Sudanese Government does not appear

terribly interested in the general well being of the Sudanese people,

the promise of overall development does not seem to be a significant

carrot for them, or in the case of the SPLA, if elites currently

enjoy the lion’s share of resources and have no interest in

accountability, how appealing will these revenue-sharing schemes

really be?

Let us start with Dr. Morrison.

Let me ask the same two witnesses if there

is a divergence between the economic and military realities that

confront the parties to the conflict in Sudan and the perceptions of

these parties. In other words, are there, sort of, if you would, any

cherished illusions that need to be dispensed with if the peace process

is to move forward?

Anything on that, Dr. Morrison?

Right.

Thank you. I have got one more for the both

of you, and then a couple for each of the other witnesses. What institutions

in Sudan do you think have demonstrated a real commitment

to improving the lives of the Sudanese people, and are these

institutions going to have a meaningful seat at the table in negotiations

about the future of Sudan?

Thank you for all those helpful answers. Ms.

Rone, what is your assessment of the administration’s view of the

oil sector and its potential to draw the parties into a peace agreement?

Is this realistic?

Do you think it is possible for an oil company

to even operate responsibly in Sudan today given the government’s

tactics and the civil war?

Yes.

Mr. Townsend, how should humanitarian access

issues in Sudan be addressed? What specific steps should be

taken on the ground in the short term to achieve our policy of approving—

or improving access and also in the long term?

Finally, would you say that the humanitarian

community is satisfied with the efforts of the United States to hold

the Government of Sudan to its commitments regarding OLS and

access?

Thank you.

Let me thank all of you not just for your patience and your help

today, but for your commitment to this situation. You are a very

impressive panel. And although we have been at this a long time,

it would be valuable to spend even more time talking to you.

This subcommittee can only handle so many hearings in a year

in fairness to my colleagues. And I hope people recognize that the

decision to hold this hearing and to spend a lot of time looking at

this in detail is a signal of how serious we are about this.

And it is a bipartisan seriousness. It is not a Republican issue.

It is not a Democratic issue. It is an issue that all Americans

should care about. And we do, of course, want the cooperation of

the Sudanese Government when it comes to our No. 1 priority,

which is fighting terrorism. And we do desperately want peace in

that country, a permanent fair peace. But we will not allow either

of those goals to undercut the necessity of protecting human rights

and guaranteeing humanitarian assistance. And that is, as far as

I am concerned, the message that I am getting from many of the

comments that each of you have made.

Thank you. For both of you, again: What

about timing? And you were sort of getting at this. Are there clear

deadlines, economic, political or military that the parties to the

conflict really need to meet to maintain their interests? And how

can the United States most effectively take advantage of the parties’

timeline to push our agenda?